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ABSTRACT: In this paper we shed light into the process of insti-
tutionalization of labor migration in Israel. Specifically, we show 
the ways by which state regulations created a fertile ground for 
the creation of a precarious and captive labor force of non-citi-
zens in the Israeli labor market. We focus on the following four 
main dimensions: (1) the policy of quotas, work permits, and 
subsidies; (2) the binding system which regulates employment 
relations; (3) the creation of an infrastructure for manpower 
agencies that over time became the main stakeholder in the 
institutionalization of labor migration; and (4) the creation of a 
complementary mechanism for the “discipline” and control of 
workers in the form of the deportation policy.
KEYWORDS: Israel; Labor migration; recruitment agencies; 
binding system; deportation.
RESUMEN: El artículo se centra en el proceso de 
institucionalización del fenómeno de migraciones laborales 
en Israel. El análisis describe las formas a través de las cuales 
las regulaciones del estado crearon las condiciones para el 
surgimiento de una fuerza de trabajo precaria y flexible de 
extranjeros en el mercado laboral Israelí. Cuatro dimensiones del 
proceso de institucionalización son analizadas: (1) la fijación de 
cuotas, otorgamiento de permisos de trabajo y subsidios, (2) el 
sistema de empleo que regula las relaciones laborales llamado 
binding, (3) la creación de una infraestructura de agencias de 
reclutamiento que se benefician de la comodificación del trabajo 
a través del cobro de tarifas ilegales a los inmigrantes, (4) la 
implementación del sistema de deportaciones como mecanismo 
de control y castigo hacia los trabajadores que no respetan las 
condiciones del contrato.
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PRODUCING TEMPORARINESS, (RE)PRODUCING PRECARIOUSNESS: REGULATION, RIGHTS AND NON-CITIZENSHIP 
STATUS OF TEMPORARY IMMIGRANT WORKERS / PRODUCIENDO TEMPORALIDAD, (RE)PRODUCIENDO PRECARIE-
DAD: REGULACIÓN, DERECHOS Y ESTATUTO NO CIUDADANO DE LOS TRABAJADORES INMIGRANTES TEMPORALES
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INTRODUCTION
Since the late 1970s, the global economy has been 
characterized by liberalization of trade, services, in-
vestment, and capital, but also by transnational move-
ments of people in search of better lives and employ-
ment opportunities in developed countries (Castles 
and Miller, 1993; Cornelius, Martin and Hollifield, 
1992; Massey et al., 1998; Sassen, 1988, 1999). While 
rich countries have outsourced to developing econo-
mies part of their industrial production and many of 
their services (e.g. call centers), there are still sectors 
in the economy of receiving societies that cannot be 
outsourced abroad but need the importation of a 
low-cost and “flexible” labor force to work in what is 
known as the 3D (dirty, dangerous, and demeaning) 
jobs in the secondary sector of the economy. Accord-
ingly, there has been a growth in temporary migrant 
worker programs in a number of receiving countries in 
North America, Western Europe, Asia, and the Middle 
East, among them Israel. 
Overseas labor migration became a significant fea-
ture of Israel society since the middle of the 1990s 
when a managed migration scheme for low-skilled 
foreign workers was enacted to replace Palestinian 
commuters from the Occupied Territories in the sec-
ondary labor market (Bartram, 1998). Labor migrants 
were formally recruited for three main sectors: con-
struction (mainly from Romania, Turkey, Bulgaria, and 
China), agriculture (from Thailand), and long term 
(domestic) care – LTC (mainly from the Philippines 
but lately also from India, Nepal and Sri Lanka). Docu-
mented and undocumented labor migrants accounted 
for 7% of the total labor force in 2009 (Central Bureau 
of Statistics, 2010).1 Their share within the Israeli la-
bor market ranked Israel at the top of the industrial-
ized economies most heavily dependent on foreign 
labor (Kemp and Raijman, 2008). 
In this paper we shed light into the process of in-
stitutionalization of labor migration in Israel. The 
study is based on a thorough documentary analysis 
of governmental decisions, parliamentary proceed-
ings of relevant committees – especially the Knesset 
Committee for Examining the Problem of Foreign 
Workers – reports produced by the Knesset’s Infor-
mation and Research Center, court rulings, local NGO 
materials, and data from various publications involv-
ing labor migration. Specifically, we show the ways 
by which state regulations created a fertile ground 
for the creation of a “precarious” labor force of non-
citizens in the Israeli labor market. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
We argue that systemic features of official labor 
migration schemes embedded in neo-liberal logics of 
governance and institutionalized power relations be-
come powerful catalysts in the creation of an unfree 
labor force taking place first and foremost within the 
realm of legal labor migration in Israel. Labor migra-
tion policy and controls not only regulate the flow of 
labor migrants but also shape certain forms of “pre-
carious workers” that cluster in particular jobs and 
segments of the labor market (Anderson 2010). 
Anderson (2010) suggests focusing on three main 
dimensions of immigration controls that lead to the 
emergence of “precarious” status among migrant 
workers: (1) the creation of categories of entrant, (2) 
the influencing of employment relations and, (3) the 
institutionalization of uncertainty.
(1) The creation of categories of entrant through the 
policy of quotas and work permits is a core dimen-
sion of state immigration controls. The policy of quo-
tas and the provision of permits is a central regulatory 
means by which the government can determine the 
extent of labor migration, as well as its nature and 
composition. As we shall see, the policy of quotas and 
permits, and the system of subsidies for employing la-
bor migrants in Israel, illustrate two important issues: 
first, the state’s commitment to providing a cheap 
and unprotected labor force to Israeli employers; and 
second, the creation of conditions for preferring labor 
migrants over Palestinian and Israeli workers in the 
secondary labor market. 
(2) The influencing of employment relations: We 
single out two principal conditions that allow legal 
mechanisms and practices to influence employment 
relations: the first is “governing labor migration from 
a distance,” referring to neoliberal configurations of 
governance that rely on the privatization of labor re-
cruitment, employment and control, and concomi-
tantly on the creation of a large for-profit industry 
of broker agencies. The institutional logic underlying 
governing at a distance relies on the devolution of cer-
tain functions to organized private actors, but more 
deeply on logics of “de-responsibilization” of state 
agencies for labor migrants’ rights and conditions 
(Kemp and Raijman, 2014). As we shall see, practices 
such as binding, turning a blind eye to charging high 
recruitment fees, and persistent reluctance to engage 
in bilateral agreements with sending countries reveal 
that a major interest of Israeli governments is to en-
sure migrants’ continuous turnover and temporari-
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ness at the expense of workers’ rights and labor mar-
ket situation. This interest is further buttressed by the 
perception of labor migration as a temporary rather 
than structural feature of the Israeli labor market and 
of non-Jewish labor migrants as a potential threat to 
the identity of the state (Kemp and Raijman, 2008).
(3) The institutionalization of uncertainty through 
the practice of deportation or the threat of “deport-
ability’ has become one of the most important tools 
for managing and controlling global migration (De 
Genova, 2002). The deportation policy in Israel is 
aimed at maximizing the state surveillance over labor 
migrants’ by punishing those who do not comply with 
the terms of employment. Furthermore, it is the threat 
of deportation or “deportability” per se that effective-
ly serves to create and sustain a legally vulnerable and 
precarious labor force of migrants as these are afraid 
to lose their jobs if they complain about legal viola-
tions and cases of fraud (De Genova, 2002). Overall, 
the three outlined dimensions expose migrant work-
ers to a high degree of regulation and mechanisms 
of control in the labor market that employers do not 
have over citizens, thus creating an exploitable, flex-
ible and cheap workforce excluded from the minimal 
protection of the welfare state (Walia, 2010). 
LABOR MIGRATION IN ISRAEL
In what follows we rely on the three outlined di-
mensions of immigration controls to analyze the case 
of labor migration in Israel.
1. The creation of categories of entrant: The policy of 
quotas and work permits 
The provision of work permits in Israel differs accord-
ing to sector of employment. Unlike the construction 
and agriculture sectors, where labor migrants were 
quite clearly meant to replace Palestinian workers, the 
recruitment of labor migrants to the LTC sector created 
an entirely new employment “niche” that was populat-
ed by non-citizen workers (Kemp and Raijman, 2008).2 
Furthermore, while the agriculture and construction 
sectors were assigned annually quotas, the LTC sector 
has no limitations regarding work permits based on 
the understanding that with longer life expectancy, the 
need for domestic caregivers for the elderly population 
would only increase over the years. 
In Figure 1 we display trends in work permits is-
sued according to employment sectors. The data 
show that while in 1996 the construction sector was 
the largest employer of migrant workers, by 2009 
the domestic care sector has became the main re-
cipient of work permits with more than half of the 
total permits granted this year. The agricultural sec-
tor has increased its share by the end of the 1990s 
and remained pretty much stable during the last 
decade. The new distribution of quotas and permits 
among the sectors undoubtedly indicated a change 
in the balance of forces between employers and 
state agencies and highlights the government’s abil-
ity to determine which sectors it wished to benefit 
(see Raijman and Kemp, 2007). 
Figure 1. Distribution of foreign workers, by economic branch
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Table 1 presents information regarding countries 
of origin of labor migrants entering Israel with work 
permits by country of citizenship in 1995 and 2010. 
The data show that the ethnic composition of the 
flows has changed over time, with migrants from 
Asia increasing their share by the end of the 1990s. 
This is explained by the changing composition of 
work permits, which has reduced the number of 
workers in construction (from East Europe) and in-
creased the number employed in agriculture (from 
Thailand) and domestic care (mainly from Philip-
pines). Given that the majority of work permits in 
the latter are granted to women, the changing com-
position of permits by sector explains the relative 
increase in the share of women arriving in Israel 
with work permits over the last decade.
The policy of quotas and permits was complement-
ed by a system of subsidies that drove employers to 
prefer labor migrants over Israeli workers. Labor mi-
grants’ employers are required to make National In-
surance payments at a rate of 0.84% of the worker’s 
gross salary, compared to 4.93% of the gross salary 
of Israeli workers. The overall percentage of National 
Insurance and Health Tax payments incumbent on Is-
raeli workers nowadays reach almost 16%, compared 
to one or two per cent for a labor migrant. 
The policy of quotas and permits, and the system 
of subsidies for employing labor migrants, illustrate 
two important issues: first, the state’s commitment 
to providing a cheap and unprotected labor force to 
Israeli employers; and second, the creation of condi-
tions for preferring labor migrants over Palestinian 
Country  of 
Citizenship
1995 2000 2009
% % Men % % Men % % Men
Asia-total 33.1 81.0 44.1 63.0 71.8 51.0
India 0.4 86.0 1.3 78.0 7.9 45.0
Turkey 7.7 94.0 3.4 98.0 3.8 99.0
Lebanon 5.9 74.0 1.7 56.0 -- --
China 2.4 97.0 5.6 96.0 4.1 94.0
Philippines 2.9 18.0 14.6 17.0 19.2 12.0
Thailand 13.3 90.0 15.3 91.0 21.1 94.0
Nepal
Other 0.5 79.0 2.1 66.0 15.8 20.8
Africa- total 0.4 75.0 1.1 51.0 0.4 90.0
Europe-total 62.3 87.0 51.1 78.0 25.6 18.0
Bulgaria 2.6 96.0 4.4 69.0 0.7 7.0
USSR (former) 3.2 85.0 8.2 66.0 19.2 9.0
Romania 52.7 89.0 31.8 86.0 3.4 19.0
Other 3.8 59.0 6.8 61.0 2.3 80.8
America-Oceania 3.0 70.0 3.3 63.0 1.9 68.0
USA 2.2 69.0 2.1 67.0 1.1 77.0
Other 0.8 71.0 1.1 55.0 0.7 54.0
Not Known 2.9 81.0 0.2 78.0 0.0 0.0
TOTAL 100.0 85.0 100.0 71.0 100.0 43.0
(78,300) (52,200) (26,600)
Mean Age 35.0 35.4 36.3
Sources: Central Bureau of Statistics, 2004, Table 4.10; 2010, Table A
Table 1. Arrival of Work Permits by Country of Citizenship and Gender Composition
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and Israeli workers in the secondary labor market. 
This is achieved through the implementation of the 
binding system and a strong policy of deportation of 
those residing in Israel without work permits (Kemp 
and Raijman, 2008). 
2. The influencing of employment relations
2.1. The Binding System
Until 2005, labor migrants’ employment was 
based on what is known as the “binding system.”3 
According to the binding system, labor migrants are 
employed by means of individually-allocated per-
mits awarded by the state to employers, and not to 
the workers themselves. The worker’s passport is 
stamped with the name of the employer for whom 
s/he is permitted to work, and s/he is forbidden 
from working for any other employer. Accordingly, 
the labor migrants’ relationship with their employ-
er, to whom work and residence permits for that 
worker are issued, is crucial to their right to work in 
Israel: workers may not leave their legal employer 
for another, and should they do so for any reason 
whatsoever, their residence permit is invalidated. 
This immediately makes the worker “deportable” 
and his/her illegal employer “punishable”. 
The implementation of the binding system is aimed 
at maximizing the surveillance over labor migrants’ 
entrance into the country and their activities in the la-
bor market, while minimizing the state’s responsibility 
for the ways in which they are recruited, the terms of 
their employment, and their living conditions. A num-
ber of regulations have been added to the binding 
system with the aim of restricting the labor migrant’s 
activities to his/her economic function. For instance, 
in order to prevent extended stays in Israel, there is 
a principle of rotation that prevents workers from 
staying for longer than 63 months.4 Also, in order to 
prevent labor migrants from establishing permanent 
residence and starting a family in Israel, they are for-
bidden from entering the country with their spouse or 
any other first degree relatives. Finally, labor migrants 
are forbidden from having children, as the moment 
they do so they are faced with two options: either to 
send the child to their country of origin and continue 
working until their visa expires or to lose their work 
and residence permits, and thus become candidates 
for immediate deportation.5 
The inherent advantages of the binding system for 
employers, however, are in no way shared by the 
workers. Indeed, contract labor has become a fertile 
ground for the violation of labor migrants’ basic so-
cial and civic rights, despite laws designed to protect 
them (Yanay and Borowosky, 1998). Israel has legis-
lated advanced laws regarding workers’ rights, includ-
ing legislation for a minimum wage, working hours, 
and working conditions. The territorial application of 
these laws enables them to be applied without dis-
crimination to all inhabitants of Israel, regardless of 
their legal status in the country. Moreover, Israel is 
a signatory to international conventions such as the 
Migration for Employment Convention of the Inter-
national Labor Organization (1949), ratified by the 
Knesset in 1953, and the International Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, ratified in 1991 (Yanay and 
Borowski, 1998). Even though Israel has wide-ranging 
and advanced protective labor laws, which also apply 
to non-citizen workers, the binding system imbues 
those laws with new meaning that makes it practically 
impossible to enforce them.
The binding system was the target of public criti-
cism largely been conducted by non-governmental 
rights organizations throughout the 1990s and into 
the early 2000s. The struggle against the binding sys-
tem peaked with the submission of a petition by sev-
eral NGOs to the Supreme Court of Justice in 2002 
to abolish it, calling for an alternative system for the 
employment of labor migrants.6 According to the 
petition, the binding system violated “fundamen-
tal constitutional rights and basic legislative norms, 
including human dignity and liberty; entitlement to 
human respect; the right to freedom of contract and 
association; the freedom of choice and action, and 
the freedom of occupation, due to the fact that it 
does not meet the requirements, and specifically 
the proportionality requirements, of the provisions 
of the basic law that allow limitations on such basic 
constitutional rights.” 
In September 2004, about two years after the 
petition was submitted, the state announced that 
a new employment method had been formulated 
in response to the problems of the binding system 
which would provide labor migrants with mobility be-
tween employers. According to this new system, that 
was implemented in 2005 in the construction sector, 
work permits are allocated to manpower corpora-
tions, while foreign workers have the practical right 
to move between employers and registered agencies, 
as long as they do not move from the sector in which 
they were permitted to work to another.7 Despite the 
state’s claims that the new system annulled the bind-
ing system, it merely bound the worker to a new em-
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ployer: the manpower corporation. According to the 
State Comptroller (2010), although the new method 
improves supervision of employment conditions a 
high percentage of corporations violated the rights 
of workers (delayed wages, not complying with social 
rights and treatment of permit issues (Raijman and 
Kushnirovich, 2012).
In 2006, the Israel Supreme Court’s accepted the 
NGOs’ petition of 2002 and demanded to abolish 
within six months the binding system and establish 
an alternative way for the employment of labor mi-
grants. In its decision the Supreme Court affirmed that 
the binding system, by violating labor migrants’ basic 
human rights, created a kind of modern slavery and 
therefore should be annulled.8
…Indeed, there is no avoiding a painful and shame-
ful conclusion… that the binding system is creating a 
modern-day version of slavery. In this binding system, 
decided on and enforced by the state, the state has 
bound the guest workers’ hands and feet to the em-
ployer that has “imported” them to Israel, no less. The 
guest worker has been transformed from a subject of 
trial—a person given rights and duties by the court—
to an object of trial, as if he were a chattel. The agree-
ment has damaged the guest workers’ autonomy as 
human beings, and has in practice denied them their 
freedom. According to this agreement, the guest 
workers have become working machines—especially 
since the employers have allowed themselves, in 
contradiction to the law, to pass them from hand to 
hand— and they have become modern-day slaves, 
like those human beings who built the pyramids or 
rowed the Roman empire’s ships to war.9
Despite such a compelling description of the bind-
ing system as modern slavery, until to date the state 
has not devised and implemented an alternative 
mode of employment that does not violate migrant 
workers’ basic rights. 
In 2010, a reform in the foreign worker employ-
ment policy for the LTC sector took place. The new 
arrangement introduced a ‘lighter’ version of bind-
ing allowing intra-sector mobility between employ-
ers and agencies. Yet, as the policy requires new 
recruits to be fully employed and mandates an al-
location of positions to LTC workers already in the 
country, it has encountered criticism on part of 
employment agencies, which strongly favor fee-
bringing international recruits. Moreover, following 
strong lobbying by representatives of the elderly 
and handicapped groups that oppose the ban on 
the binding system, an independent bill from 2011 
(dubbed by opponents as the “slavery bill”) enables 
the Minister of Interior to limit the geographical 
area in which migrant care-givers can work and the 
number of transfers between employers that they 
can have (Natan, 2011, pp. 6-7).10 Thus, after three 
years in which migrants had been somewhat freer 
to switch employers, binding has been reinstated, 
exacerbating the already precarious status of mi-
grant workers in the domestic care-giving sector. As 
for the agriculture sector, a reform proposed back in 
2004 (by the Endorn Committee) to allow visa por-
tability by shifting the personal binding to corporate 
binding has not been carried out. 
The reluctance on part of the state to forego differ-
ent types of binding and to fully implement govern-
ment’ decisions is explained by strong pressures ex-
erted by employers’ lobbies (see Raijman and Kemp, 
2007; State Comptroller, 2010). Binding is a particular, 
albeit extreme, example of more general governance 
institutional logics whereby the outsourcing of con-
trol and management capacities allows public actors 
to gain greater autonomy from societal demands. The 
same logic of “outsourcing” drives the withdrawal of 
public agencies from the screening and recruitment 
process in the countries of origin. This has led to the 
creation of a private brokerage industry that operates 
transnationally and whose expansion relies on profits 
from recruitment fees collected from the labor mi-
grants before they arrive.
2.2. Manpower companies and labor recruitment
One of the central characteristics of labor migration 
in Israel is the privatization of the recruitment, me-
diation, administration, and employment of labor mi-
grants to the hands of manpower agencies that serve 
as a kind of sub-contractor for both the state itself and 
private employers. 
The Israeli state gave the manpower and brokerage 
agencies a central role by creating the conditions that 
made manpower agencies “essential”, that is, their 
being the only bodies authorized to come into contact 
with the authorities in recruiting and employing labor 
migrants. In fact, the licensing system implemented in 
2005 in the construction sector made the activities of 
the manpower agencies in recruiting and employing 
labor migrants essential for both workers and employ-
ers, as from then on the license for a work permit was 
given to the corporation and not to the de facto em-
ployer or the worker.
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A second way that the state turned manpower 
agencies into the only body entitled to deal with the 
authorities in this regard was actually by providing a 
monopoly in recruiting workers to organized bodies 
like the Moshav movement in the agriculture sector.11 
The Moshav Movement’s exclusive management of 
the labor migrant market in the agricultural sector 
continued uninterrupted until 1998, at which point 
the government allowed other manpower agencies to 
enter this profitable “niche”. 
A third way that the manpower agencies became 
“essential” in the field of labor migration was through 
bureaucratic stipulations. This is particularly notable 
in the domestic care sector, where the entire pro-
cedure by which the employer and the worker are 
brought together – for instance in obtaining a permit 
– must be carried out through manpower agencies, 
by order of the Ministry of the Interior.12 As a result, 
and unlike the agriculture and construction sectors – 
in which the state’s involvement goes no further than 
deciding the framework of quotas, issuing work per-
mits, and providing licenses to manpower agencies – 
in the domestic care sector the state has an additional 
and important role: it pays the salaries of most of the 
LTC workers by means of nursing care benefits. 
A new Israeli industry: Trafficking in human beings?
Although it was the state that created the condi-
tions for the burgeoning of the manpower agen-
cies, the primary factor behind their prosperity was, 
naturally enough, purely economic. Even though 
until 2006 there were laws forbidding agencies from 
charging recruitment fees from workers, the bulk of 
the manpower agencies’ profits derive precisely from 
such fees paid by the labor migrants themselves. The 
long-term lack of law enforcement concerning the 
activities of Israeli manpower agencies overseas cre-
ated an expansive migration industry in which recruit-
ing agencies and brokers, both in Israel and countries 
of origin benefit from the commodification of labor 
(State Comptroller, 2010). 
Since July 2006 Israeli law permits agencies to col-
lect brokerage fees of no more than 3,479 NIS per 
worker (about $900; this sum is updated annually) in 
addition to travel expenses. But manpower agencies 
continue to flout the rules and charge sizable recruit-
ment fees, which have even swollen over time. Com-
panies in the Philippines, Thailand, and China (among 
others) charge fees ranging from $4,000 to $30,000 
for tests, recruitment fees, and air fares. Recruitment 
fees paid by the workers are shared by manpower 
agencies in the country of origin and in Israel (Raijman 
and Kushnirovich, 2012).
The long-term absence of enforcement of the law 
on the activities of Israeli manpower agencies over-
seas has created an extensive “grey” industry that 
provides the basis for trafficking in human beings in 
Israel (Kemp and Raijman, 2008). In addition to re-
cruitment fees, sometimes the manpower agencies 
demand that the labor migrants deposit a “guaran-
tee” to ensure that they will not leave their original 
employer (Pilovsky, 1999). Even though this method 
of recruitment into debt bondage has been exposed 
and subjected to public criticism, it is still highly ac-
tive. In February 2003 a scandal involving Bulgarian 
workers hit the headlines. They had been recruited 
by a manpower agency, which demanded that each 
worker deposit a guarantee of $5,000 and that they 
mortgage their homes to the agency to ensure their 
fulfillment of their obligations to the contractors. The 
same company even promised to compensate the 
contractors $5,000 for every worker dared to leave 
them (Kemp and Raijman, 2008). 
Following the intervention of Israeli NGOs, these 
issues came to the attention of the US State Depart-
ment in 2003. A State Department report defined the 
situation in Israel, whereby manpower agencies re-
quired labor migrants to mortgage their properties to 
ensure that they uphold their labor contract in Israel, 
as “debt bondage,” and demanded that the Israeli 
government look into it and take care of the matter 
immediately. Since 2003, the US State Department 
report on Trafficking in Persons has ranked Israel in 
Tier 2 with the group of countries in which the phe-
nomenon is strongly marked: “some foreign labor-
ers enter into Israel for labor under conditions that 
constitute trafficking. Some laborers are subjected to 
debt bondage and restriction on their movements, 
including employer confiscation of their passports” 
(U.S. Department of State, 2006, p. 194). Follow-up 
reports published by the State Department since 2003 
maintained that despite an improvement in the Israeli 
government’s efforts to combat human trafficking, it 
was still not doing enough to meet even the minimal 
standards to eradicate it.13 
In order to combat this phenomenon, the Israeli 
government decided to sign bilateral agreements with 
some countries from which migrants were usually re-
cruited.14 So far bilateral agreements were signed with 
Thailand to recruit workers for the agriculture sector 
and with Bulgaria, Moldova, and Rumania to recruit 
workers for the construction sector. 
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Under the agreement signed with Thailand in 
2010,15 a newly created framework of cooperation, 
the Thailand-Israel Cooperation on the Placement of 
Workers (TIC), is in charge of the recruitment of mi-
grant workers in agriculture, and the management and 
supervision of the recruitment process is conducted 
by the IOM (International Organization for Migration). 
Israeli and Thai private agencies are no longer directly 
involved in such recruitment. Israeli local agencies are 
now responsible for the workers only after their ar-
rival, a service for which they are permitted to charge 
a fee set in advance.16 
Research conducted to evaluate the impact of bi-
lateral agreements has shown a dramatic reduction 
in the recruitment fees paid by the migrants. Thai 
migrant workers paid circa $9,000 before the imple-
mentation of the bilateral agreement (BA). However, 
after the implementation of the BA the “cost of migra-
tion” - the total expenses (in US dollars) - has been 
extremely reduced to an average $1,200 for those ar-
riving before March 2013 and circa $2,200 for those 
arriving after March 2013, when an additional pay-
ment of 2,724 N.I.S (approximately $780) to the local 
manpower agencies in Israel was approved.17 
Bilateral agreements have been signed with Bul-
garia, Moldova and lately with Romania to recruit 
migrant worker in construction sector. Bulgarian and 
Moldovan workers do not pay recruitment fees at all 
but need only take care of costs associated with flight 
tickets, medical examinations, and preparation and 
translation of documents, among others. Therefore 
the cost of migration is rather low, $500 on average, 
if we compare it with the amounts of money paid by 
Chinese workers arriving though private recruitment: 
22,000 US dollars (see Raijman and Kushnirovich 
2012). The gap in the “before” and “after” payments 
made by the migrant workers is a clear indicator of 
the impact of the new system of recruitment on the 
fees paid by the migrants (Raijman and Kushnirovich 
2015). It should be noted that a bilateral agreement 
has been signed with Nepal (August 2015) but still 
most of the recruitment of workers in the caregiving 
sector is conducted through private agencies.
3. The Institutionalization of Uncertainty: 
Deportation Policy
One of the most important pillars in the policy of la-
bor migration is the deportation policy implemented 
among migrants residing in Israel without work per-
mits. During the last 15 years, labor migrants with-
out permits comprised between forty to fifty percent 
of the total population of migrant workers in Israel. 
There are three main pathways to becoming a foreign 
worker without a permit: (1) tourists who overstay 
their visa, (2) foreign workers that lose their work and 
residence permits by leaving the employer to whom 
they are bound, (3) foreign workers with permits that 
overstay their work visa.18
The primary method for dealing with the so called 
illegal labor migrants was to turn their deportation into 
a systematic policy.19 Between 1995 and 2008 over 
76000 migrant workers were deported with 2003 and 
2004 constituting the peak years (Bar Zuri, 2009). The 
most significant organizational and institutional expres-
sion of the deportation policy was the establishment 
of the new Immigration Administration in 2002 (Gill 
and Dahan, 2006). From the outset, the Immigration 
Police had a double function: on the one hand, it was 
an enforcement mechanism, and on the other it was 
an apparatus for disseminating information, primarily 
to employers in Israel, who had been enjoying a large 
and accessible pool of undocumented labor migrants 
who were not subject to the government’s quota poli-
cy. Accordingly, since its establishment the Immigration 
Police has not refrained from detailing to the public the 
supposed threats latent in the phenomenon: an eco-
nomic threat (“the illegal foreign workers have a sig-
nificant impact on natives’ unemployment”; “there is a 
financial drain from Israel to their countries of origin”; 
“they hardly pay taxes, which creates a heavy burden 
on infrastructure without assisting in its maintenance”); 
a demographic and national threat (“demographically 
speaking, a ‘state’ within a ‘state’ is taking shape”; “the 
Jewish character of the state is being damaged by in-
termarriage”); and even a security threat (“because of 
their lack of affinity to Israel, the illegal residents are 
liable to be a platform for security crimes and hostile 
destructive activity” (Gill and Dahan 2006).
However, the concrete consequences of this cru-
sade against the phenomenon of “illegal employment” 
mostly impacted on illegal immigrants and their fami-
lies, and much less on their Israeli employers. This is 
clearly indicated by the Immigration Authority’s bud-
get, of which, in 2004, only one per cent was allocated 
for activities against employers who violated labor mi-
grants’ rights (for instance, by confiscating their pass-
ports, trafficking in human beings, providing unbefit-
ting living and working conditions, holding wages back, 
and so on), while most of the resources were devoted 
to arresting and deporting the migrants themselves. 
The Immigration Police represented an important 
turning point in the scope of the deportation of un-
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documented labor migrants: according to its own 
reports, since its establishment in September 2002, 
118,105 people have left Israel, 40,000 of whom were 
deported. Mass deportation operations were carried 
out after migrants had been arrested following raids 
on houses, places of work, buses, and shopping cen-
ters, and even after street chases. Such arrests, many 
of which were accompanied by callous violence on 
the part of the police and the crude violation of rights, 
became an everyday spectacle (Gill and Dahan, 2006). 
It was not only the sheer quantity of deportations 
that changed, but also the target groups. Recognizing 
the central role played by community networks and 
organizations in the lives of undocumented migrants, 
police activities were not only directed at individuals, 
but also at dismantling the communities themselves. 
Expansive police and intelligence work was devoted 
to locating and deporting community leaders, and 
raiding places where labor migrants held community 
gatherings and spent their leisure time (see e.g. Sinai, 
2004, 2005; Wurgaft, 2004). 
One of the main consequences of the establish-
ment of the Immigration Police, therefore, was that 
state mechanisms singled out labor migrants as the 
scapegoat for Israel’s economic and social ills. This 
enabled the government to hide from the public the 
very conditions that had led to the phenomenon of 
“foreign workers” in the first place. Indeed, it was 
the state itself that had allowed the massive recruit-
ment of cheap labor migrants and offered a series of 
incentives for preferring them over other workers. 
Meanwhile, it had consistently turned a blind eye to 
their shameful working conditions, and ignored the 
unintended consequences that accompanied the re-
cruitment of labor migrants when some of them be-
come migrants on a permanent basis. By detaching 
decisions and government policy from the phenom-
enon of the “illegal aliens”, and by presenting them 
as appearing both to break the law and violate Israel’s 
sovereignty, the government could absolve itself of all 
responsibility (Kemp and Raijman, 2008).
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has outlined the ways by which labor 
migration has been institutionalized in Israel and 
highlighted the mechanisms through which a pool 
of precarious workers has emerged in the local labor 
market. By paving the way for the massive recruit-
ment of labor migrants, the state was able to deliver 
political and economic benefits to employers (in the 
construction and agriculture sector) and compensate 
them for the forced withdrawal of Palestinian workers 
from the Israeli labor market. The state was able to do 
this through the ordered provision of imported cheap 
labor and the creation of a significant pool of non-free 
workers through the binding system and related laws. 
These laws effectively subject workers to a high de-
gree of regulation, giving employers mechanisms of 
control that they do not have over citizens. Through 
enforcing atypical employment relations such as fixed 
term contracts and direct dependence on employers 
on legal status, these regulations create a group of 
workers that are more desirable as employees to local 
employers (Anderson, 2010). 
The liberalization of the Israeli labor market taking 
place since the middle of the 1980s also enabled the 
state to absolve itself of any responsibility for the mi-
grant workers, and instituted the conditions for the 
emergence of a stratum of social actors –employ-
ers and manpower agencies- who would reap the 
benefits of this new state of affairs. Stringent state 
regulations applied to labor migrants (such as the 
binding system and the threat of automatic deporta-
tion), coupled with flimsy state prosecution of law-
breaking employers, have provided the means and 
the opportunity for the legal labor migration system 
to become into a captive labor force, sometimes 
even degenerating into a human trafficking industry 
(Kemp and Raijman, 2014). However, the implemen-
tation of bilateral agreements in the construction 
and agricultural sectors has had a strong impact both 
on the process of recruitment of workers. The whole 
recruiting process is monitored through its various 
stages by national offices (Ministry of Labor in Thai-
land, Bulgaria, and Moldova and the PIBA in Israel) 
and international agencies (IOM in Thailand), and 
the fees have been dramatically reduced lowering 
the debts which migrants incurred to finance their 
move to Israel. This new situation allows to workers 
to feel free to move between employers, complain 
in case of rights violations, or even return to their 
countries of origin before the end of the contract 
(see Raijman and Kushnirovich, 2015). The success-
ful experience of bilateral agreements in the agricul-
ture and construction sectors in lowering the “cost 
of migration” suggests the need to implement the 
same type of arrangements in the caregiving sec-
tor in which still migrants workers are asked to pay 
exorbitant fees to come to work in Israel. It should 
be noted that the impact of the implementation of 
bilateral agreements is less evident with regard to 
migrant workers’ rights and living and working con-
ditions (Raijman and Kushnirovich, 2015). 
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1. Palestinian workers from the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip were recruited 
following the Six Day War in 1967, to 
perform mostly menial, low-status, 
manual jobs in the Israeli labor mar-
ket. By 1987 they comprised seven 
percent of the entire Israeli labor 
force (Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein, 
1987). The outbreak of the first In-
tifada (Palestinian uprising) in 1987 
created a shortage of labor in low-sta-
tus positions, when the entry of non-
citizen Palestinian workers into Israel 
was prevented because of imposed 
closure or self-imposed strikes. These 
events set the initial stage for the or-
ganized recruitment of overseas labor 
migrants (Bartram, 1998). 
2. The Long Term Care Insurance Act, 
which came into effect in April 1988, 
marked the starting point for large-
scale migration of caregiving workers 
into Israel. The Act permitted those 
in need of geriatric care to hire non-
Israeli care workers, allowing the 
elderly to continue living in their fa-
miliar familial and social environment 
(Ofir et al., 2001).
3. This arrangement is rooted in the Entry 
into Israel Law, 1952, the Employment 
Service Law, 1959, as well as in Clause 
1M(a) of the Foreign Workers (Prohibi-
tion of Unlawful Employment and As-
surance of Fair Conditions) Law, 1991
4. In June 2004, a new procedure was 
implemented, the initiative of Minis-
ter of the Interior, Avraham Poraz, by 
which labor migrants in the domestic 
care can be given a work permit for 
more than 5 years, with no time limit, 
if a professional opinion is proffered 
that asserts that taking the worker 
away from his or her patient would 
cause damage to the latter. 
Israel Law (Amendment N. 21, 5771-
2011 SB 926). Its provisions are likely 
to increase care-givers’ dependency 
on their employers, thereby deterring 
workers from claiming their rights or 
leaving abusive employers. Moreover, 
the bill is inconsistent with the Hight 
Court of Justice’s ruling against bind-
ing (HCJ 4524/02). 
11. Thus, for example, in the agricultural 
sector, the Moshav Movement came 
to have the power of attorney of all 
the employers in the field of agricul-
ture. Some argue that the consider-
able profits made throughout the 
1990s by the Moshav Movement 
from its new role as the umbrella or-
ganization that regulated the recruit-
ment and employment of labor mi-
grants enabled it to extract itself from 
a deep financial crisis (Pilovsky, 1999).
12. On the problems with this arrange-
ment, see the Protocol of the Special 
Knesset Committee for the Problem 
of Foreign Workers, 3.7.01, 10.
13. For a detailed examination of traf-
ficking in labor migrants in Israel see 
Worker’s Hotline, Annual Report for 
2002, www.kavlaoved.org.il.
14. The agreement follows Government 
Resolution 3453 according to which 
migrant construction workers shall 
be recruited only on the basis of bi-
lateral agreements. http://www.piba.
gov.il/SpokesmanshipMessagess/
Pages/2011-30011.aspx (accessed 
January 20, 2012).
15. It should be noted that although the 
government resolution regarding 
the signing of a bilateral agreement 
with Thailand was passed in 2005, 
the current agreement was signed in 
5. In 2005, a group of human rights or-
ganizations appealed to the Supreme 
Court of Justice against this proce-
dure, which they characterized as dis-
criminating between the labor rights 
of Israeli and non-Israeli women. The 
Israel’s Supreme Court of Justice ver-
dict (11437/05) in 2011 overturned 
the policy, calling on the Ministry of 
Interior to take steps towards formu-
lating a new one. So far, however, the 
Israeli government has determined 
no specific procedures regarding the 
terms of work and living conditions 
of migrant women who gave birth to 
a child and wish to continue to work 
and live with their child in Israel.
6. SCJ 4542/02. The petition to cancel 
the binding system was submitted by 
the following organizations: Worker’s 
Hotline, The Hotline for Migrant 
Workers, The Association for Civil 
Rights in Israel, Physicians for Human 
Rights, The Adva Center, and Com-
mitment to Peace and Social Justice 
– which runs a Center for the Rights 
of the Unemployed – and the Tel Aviv 
University Welfare and Law Program.
7. Report of the Inter-ministerial Com-
mittee on “The Mode of Employing 
Foreign Workers in Israel and Con-
ditions for Issuing Permits,” August 
2004, 8.
8. Supreme Court Petition 4542/02:21. 
For a discussion of the legal aspects 
of the employment of labor migrants 
in Israel, and of the role of the courts, 
see Sitbon, 2006.
9. Judge Heshin, Supreme Court Petition 
4542/02.
10. The bill, which passed in 2011, intro-
duced an amendment to the Entry to 
Finally, the current migration regime in Israel is high-
ly exclusionary regarding non-Jews (those not covered 
by the amendment to the Law of Return) and also re-
moves a priori any possibility of incorporation for non-
Jewish migrants. Unwillingness to accept non-Jewish 
immigrants is expressed through exclusionary immi-
gration policies (especially limitation of family reunion 
and refusal to secure residence status), restrictive 
naturalization rules, and a double standard: exclusion-
ary model for non- Jews as against an “acceptance-
encouragement” model for Jews (Raijman, Semyonov 
and Schmidt, 2003). In that sense, Israel’s migration 
policy towards labor migrants reflects the state’s nev-
er-ending anxiety about a changing ethnoscape that 
may pose a threat to its Jewish character. Labor mi-
grants may thus be considered “margizens”, that is, a 
new category of people who, denied membership in 
the host society, remain excluded in legal, social, cul-
tural and political terms (Kemp et al., 2000).
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